Is peace with Iran possible?

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power and the subsequent potential to develop atomic weapons is a problem that just refuses to go away. In spite of President Obama’s attempts to normalise relations between the United States and Iran and the persistent activism of the United Nations and the EU to broker a deal, a viable solution remains far off. As we speak, the International Atomic Energy Agency is pressing the regime for access to inspect its nuclear sites.

Six years ago, then President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were successful in persuading Libya to abandon its nuclear programme, leading to a gradual thaw in relations between the three nations. So, why has striking a similar agreement with Iran proved so impossible? Simply put, Iran boasts far greater power and influence, in what is probably the most volatile region in the world, than Libya ever did. Specifically, the Iranians possess a weapon potentially just as devastating as the nuclear bombs they are accused of developing: oil. More to the point, they have the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf: their territorial waters through which, it is estimated, over 16m barrels of oil are transported every day.

Furthermore, Iran is not your typical adversary in the military sense. Its available arsenal doesn’t just include conventional weapons. Rather, it is their unprecedented influence in post-Saddam Iraq, their domination of the fragile Afghan economy and their support for Hezbollah in Lebanon that, combined with their nuclear programme, pose such a serious threat to the regional interests of the United States and perhaps most notably, Israel.

Much has been written on the potential for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear installations, and while American support for military action appears less likely under the Obama administration, it cannot be ruled out. Economic sanctions are the weapon of choice for now though; both a realistic alternative and more likely to secure wide international support. This has been compounded by regular joint American and Israeli war games in the Gulf, presumably to show the Iranians what they’re capable of.

Yet such sabre-rattling appears fruitless when compared with each country’s record on actual conflict with Iran, indirectly or otherwise. Israel’s war with Lebanon in 2006, largely seen as a dress rehearsal for a potential showdown with the Islamic Republic, as a well as a test-run for Israel’s US-made ‘bunker busting’ weapons, resulted in a humbling withdrawal. Similarly, the US invasion of Iraq was seen by many neo-cons in Washington as an ideal opportunity to topple the Ayatollah by establishing a secular democracy on the Iranians’ doorstep. However, if any country was infiltrated and re-modelled from the inside, it was Iraq. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), that swept the board in the country’s first federal and provincial elections after the invasion, was created by Ayatollah Khomeini himself in 1982.

Nevertheless, the Iranians have little cause for complacency. They are not invincible and there is only so much provocation the United States and Israel will tolerate before they conclude that military action is their only option. Iran’s ‘oil weapon’ may be potentially devastating to the US, but it would seriously hamper its own economy too. International opinion is not on their side either, with even their trusted Russian allies appearing more open to the idea of sanctions following Obama’s rapprochement with the old enemy.

Diplomacy is still an option, but there are many sticking points. According to Ephraim Kam of the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, in order for a Libya-style deal to satisfy the West, Iran would have to give up its nuclear programme, end its involvement in terrorism, cease its disruption of the Arab-Israeli peace process and improve human rights in Iran. In turn, the Iranians want guarantees for their security, large-scale technological assistance and greater influence in the region.

The problem is that the United States have refused to put any of the other issues on the table until they secure a concession on the nuclear question, while the Iranians have been understandably reluctant to give away their biggest bargaining chip before any real negotiations begin. The Europeans have attempted to address this by proposing a ‘comprehensive dialogue’ agreement, but without an American commitment to talk, it is worthless.

However, there is another way. A bilateral agreement with Israel to halt all uranium enrichment in return for total nuclear disarmament (surely Iran’s biggest motivating factor for going nuclear in the first place), subject to the supervision of the IAEA could end the standoff and prevent the imminent proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the rest of the Middle East. There was even a fleeting report in the press last week of secret meetings taking place between Israeli and Iranian officials to this end. How accurate those reports are and how viable such a plan would be, however, remains to be seen.

Europe - the great missed opportunity

When the historians come to write the obituary of the outgoing Labour government what will they say was the greatest missed opportunity of their 13 year reign? According to the New Statesman, Tony Blair told his friends, upon leaving office, that the greatest regret of his premiership was abandoning what his one-time mentor Roy Jenkins called the “breaking the mould” options open to him in the wake of new Labour's landslide victory in 1997.

Several of these options still remain open to Labour in its final months under Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, including: the introduction of proportional representation for the Commons, a fully elected second chamber and a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. However, the single greatest missed opportunity that may never come by again, and by far Blair’s biggest regret, is the failure to overturn decades of British hostility to the EU.

In 2001, Tony Blair appeared to have successfully cemented Britain’s position at the heart of Europe. The Kosovo war had brought with it a mutual recognition by leading EU member states of the need for a single European foreign and defence policy to prevent the horrors of ethnic cleansing on their doorstep from ever happening again. Britain’s entry into the new single currency also seemed highly probable, if not inevitable, while the euroscpetic Conservatives were in disarray and languishing in the polls. So what went wrong?

Blair’s hesitation over the Euro was initially stymied by a lack of support from his then chancellor, Gordon Brown, and a threat to withdraw public support altogether by the Sun newspaper. Nevertheless, he planned to force the issue in a speech to the Trades Union Congress on September 11th 2001. However, his speech was never delivered as two airplanes were flown into the Twin Towers in New York with dramatic ramifications for British foreign policy thereafter.

9/11 similarly affected plans for a single European foreign and defence policy as the invasion of Iraq that followed led to the biggest rift in transatlantic relations since the fall of the Soviet Union as Britain prioritised its alliance with America over its relationship with Europe. However, it was additionally hampered by, amongst other things, a chronic underinvestment in defence by the big EU 3, Britain, Germany and France, and concerns in Washington over a potential threat to the remit of NATO.

However, the election of a multilateralist President in the United States and the onset of the Great Recession have gone a long way to mending relations between Britain and Europe. Indeed, as the world faces up to the grim reality that the biggest challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, regulating the global economy and tackling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, cannot be combated by any nation state alone, there has never been a more important time for the UK to take a leading role in European integration.

Yet just as the conditions for rapprochement fall into place, a Labour government that for so long took the European Union for granted looks set to be replaced by a Conservative one that wants little or nothing to do with it. As a result, Britain will be consigning itself to isolation at the very moment it cannot afford to stand alone. What’s more, the rest of Europe will not wait forever.